In this format, developed by the LNR research group at The University of California at San Diego, verbs are represented as interconnected sets of subpredicates.
These subpredicates may be thought of as the almost inevitable inferences that a listener makes when a verb is used in a sentence.
They confer a meaning structure on the sentence in which the verb is used.
To be psychologically valid, these representations should capture (at least):
I. Similarity of meaning
The more similar two verbs seem in meaning to people, the more their representations should overlap.
Confusability
The more confusable two verb meanings are, the more their representations should overlap.
Memory for sentences
containing the verb The sentence structures set up by the verb's meaning should in part determine the way in which sentences are remembered.
Semantic integration
The representations should allow for the integration of information from different sentences into discourse structure
Acquisition patterns
The structural partitions in the representations should correspond to the structures children acquire when they are learning the meanings of the verbs.
Patterns of extension
The representations should be extendible so as to reflect the ways in which people interpret verb meanings when the verbs are used outside their normal context.
Reaction times
The time taken to comprehend a sentence using a given verb should reflect the structural complexity of the verb meaning. 
Representation of Verb Me~ning
There are many notational systems for representation of verb meaning (e.g., Abrahamson, 1975; Chafe, 1970; Fillmore, 1971; Gentner, 1975; Lakoff, 1970; McCawley, 1968; Rumelhart & Levin, 1975; Schank, 1972 Schank, , 1975 Talmy, 1975 An agent may cause a change of state that relates to another object.
Or the same person may act on both agent and experiencer of the change of state.
The locational verb move can be used in either way, as in the following examples:
a. Ida moved the car. b. Ida moved to the front seat.
In both these casesthe action taken by Ida is unspecified.
We (1975) volume. There are certainly gaps in the system, and aspects of verb meaning that are not expressible in this simple vocabulary. Some unresolved issues are discussed later in the paper.
However, the system seems plausible at the first level, and allows a fair range of verb meanings to be captured at least roughly.
At this point in the research it seemed appropriate to begin testing the psychological rightness of the system as so far stated before going on to refine it. But, suppose that within a short time after hearing a verb in a sentence, a person has only the representational network of concepts and relationships, and not the surface verb. Assume further that some pieces of the memory representation may be lost or unaccessible at any time (the "fallibility of human memory" assumption).
Then the more two verb representations overlap, the more likely it is that sentences containing the two verbs will be confused in memory, despite people's attempts to keep them straight. In an experiment in sentence memory, using verbs of varying semantic overlap, I found that subjects did indeed confuse the verbs in exactly the way predicted by the theory (Gentner, 1974) . The correlation between the number of confusions subjects made between two verbs and the semantic overlap between the verbs, as predicated from the representations, was quite high.
In fact, the correlation between representational overlap and number of confusions was slightly higher (though not significantly so) than the correlation between the number of confusions and the rated similarity between the verbs. (The similarity ratings were taken from the first-mentioned study, with a different set of subjects).
Semantic complexity.
Semantic complexity refers to the number of underlying subpredicates and interconnections that make up the basic meaning of a verb.
More complex meanings correspond to more specific actions or events.
For example, stride is more specific than go. Its meaning contains more subpredicates.
We know more having heard sentence (a) than sentence (b). This prediction is quite specific. It is not simply a question of certain complex versus simple verbs having some overall effect, but rather of complex verbs providing extra connections between the particular nouns in question. This is clearly true for Ida and her tenants in the case of sell versus give, as can be seen in Fig 3a and 3b. I tested for this kind of improvement in connectivity in a series of experiments in sentence memory (Gentner, 1977) . I read people sentences that differed in the semantic connectivity of their verbs, such as the following pair of sentences:
Ida gave her tenants a clock.
Ida sold her tenants a clock. (complex connective) Then I gave the people the names of the characters and asked them to recall the sentences.
As predicted, they were better able to recall the noun tenants when the complex connective verb sell was used then when the simple verb give was used. More semantic connections between the two nouns led to stronger memory connections.
To see the specificity of the prediction, consider a complex verb that merely amplifies the simple verb and does not add connections between the key nouns. For example, the verb mail (Fig 3c) adds the information that the method of transfer was by mailing or some such long-distance transfer.
Using mail leads to more inferences (a more specific event description) than using give.
However, the knowledge that the object was mailed leads to few, if any, additional connections between the agent, Ida, and the recipient, tenants. Therefore, the prediction was that use of such non-connecting specific verbs would lead to no improvement over use of general verbs in memory between the nouns.
The results were exactly as predicted: The object nouns of complex connective verbs were recalled better than those of general verbs and non-connecting complex verbs. These differences were not traceable to differences in imagery or word-frequency. Thus connectivity is beneficial to sentence memory in a very specific way.
Accuis~ion.
There may be a more direct relationship between complexity and difficulty in children than in adults.
Young children often fail to comprehend the full meanings of semantically complex terms (e.g., Bowerman, 1975; Clark, 1973; Gentner, 1975, in press ). Working with the verbs of possession, I have observed that children act out the simple verbs gLve and takacorrectly before they act out the more complex verbs b~¥ and trade. Still later they learn the yet more complex verbs bu¥, sell and spend. The order in which the verbs are learned is exactly the order of increasing semantic complexity. This complexity ordering can be made quite precise, since the verbs are closely related in meaning.
The representation of a verb at the nth level of simplicity is properly nested within the representation of a verb at the (n+1)th level.
Further, when children around 4-6 years are asked to act out sell (as in "Make Ernie sell Bert a boat.") they act out give instead (A boat is transferred from Ernie to Bert). Similarly, bu~ is acted out as take.
They systematically act out complex verbs like simple verbs; and more surprisingly, they choose the appropriate simple verb.
My interpretation, consistent with Clark's (1973) semantic features analysis, is that children learn these complex verb meanings gradually, by adding components to their partially correct representations. At any given time, the child comprehends language in terms of the components that he has so far acquired.
Semantic ~ntegration.
Another important psychological requirement is combinability. The basic notions of state, change of state, cause, and so on must be combinable into networks larger than the individual sentence. When two verbs share parts of their underlying structure, this redundancy should be utilized to combine the two representations into one discourse structure. How can we test whether this happens? One way is to arrange things so that collapsing the redundancies between two verbs should create the representation of a third verb.
Then the prediction is that people should use this third verb in recall.
In a study of semantic integration, I read people short passages and tested their memory by having them fill in blanks (Gentner, 1978) .
Every passage contained a general verb, such as give. Half the passages also contained additional semantic information, such as the fact that the giver actually owed the money he was giving.
According to the representational model, the integration of the representation of give with that of owing should have created the structure of pay.
If what people have in their minds after hearing the verbs is the network representations, and if these representations are integrated during discourse comprehension, then people who heard give and owe should end up with the representation of DaY. As predicted, subjects hearing the extra material falsely recalled the verb which best fit the composite structure (e.g. nay) rather than the verb actually presented.
Further lssues
I have made the assumption that a verb carries with it a set of inferences that are normally made during comprehension, as well as several supporting assumptions.
This view has been fairly well supported by the research presented here, but nevertheless it seems to me an oversimplification.
There remain a great many questions, some large and some small. (I) Where should the line be drawn around a word's meaning? As Clark and Clark (1977) have put it, is word meaning more like a dictionary or an encyclopedia?
The extreme of the dictionary approach would be to take a minimal contrast approach, storing with a word only enough to distinguish it from all other words.
The extreme of the encyclopedia approach would be to access the entire long-term memory whenever any word is used. The question is, how to define a reasonable middle ground. (2) 
